# THE NATURE OF PHALOSOPHY:

THINGS YOUR LECTURER 'AINT' THE BALLS TO TELL YOU; A SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF PHILOSOPHY; COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL THOUGHTS AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS, DEMONSTRATING THE END OF PHILOSOPHERS & PHILOSOPHY



BY

**COLIN LESLIE DEAN & DAVID STEPHEN OVENDEN** 

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FRONT COVER PICTURE: 'DETAIL FROM 'GOLDFISH' BY G. KLIMT

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You and vententives, rebel, break free, exert your individuality, throw of the shackels of tradition, uniformity, homoschill and the Isranny of orthodoxy. Do you keep the least of your lawn like the length of your bair. Is your controlled, submissive, conformist life expressed in your literary and academic style; brenh free, let your hair down, donot dot your I's and cross your i's . Do you adopt the style of appravance of the clique you are trying to impress, belong to or want the adulation from, break free. This coda argues that the orative process is more important than literary and academic style. If a work is judged upon it's spelling mistakes, footmoting errors and not upon it's contributions to it's are then those making the judgment are fight are anal retentives . This code argues that literary and academic style is eform of tyrang and Sascism. If style becomes more important time content of th north itself then creating is destroyed . Though the literary and academie evrous in this work were not put there purposely their appearance was not avoided, evased or convected as evvors are part of the creature processand inducate the induduality of the work and action. The preoccupation with eners 13.4 be and retentives submission to authority and the tyrang of styles a tyranny the direct consequence of a sterilised world obsessed with perfected and appearance over and about the costest, a world of superficiality. So long as errors donot hinder literary or academic pursuits their presence is part of the creatin process and indicate the imperfect individuately of the action long live freedom, long live content, down with appearance. For these and verter fires who disparse this north pecause of its errors look to sourselves perhaps your style, your appearance is as perfect, sterilized, homoscorous as the perfect, stevilised homogenised world your in habit. Are you a perfect Sterilized eventus of this perfect Sterilized hamogenised world. Is this would like your mind; break free, long here literary and academic anarchi

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#### PREFACE

Awake you poor stupid student!!! Awake to the nature of life. Awake you poor stupid student. Awake those who think integrity, rationality, honour and the objective pursuit of truth is what the world of scholarship is about. Awake open your eyes to what the real world is. Awake read the Marquis de Sade's 'Justine'. Awake to what is required to advance, to become one of the brotherhood of scholars. Ask the **arse lickers**, the **crawlers**, the sycophants, those who lay their lectures, supervisors, bosses. They know the truth, they now the nature of life- toe the line. Awake you poor stupid students. Awake!!!!

he opportunity to study at a university is no longer a right but a privilege a privilege that is increasingly only afforded to the rich. Perhaps then it should also come as no surprise to learn that the content of what is studied, as well as the language that intellectual material is written in, is also that of a privileged few. Universities are exclusively devoted to the propagation of our society's values and beliefs that serve those interest groups concerned with the maintenance of the status quo. There are no surprises in stating that there is an absolute connection between language and power. The power to manipulate what is thought (educational content) is afforded by the exclusivity of the language that is used (the words used to contextualize the content). Dean acknowledges this exclusivity of language in Book One, where he attempts to introduce a style of expression which attempts to offer an alternative to the pervasiveness of middle class language. This style is direct, confronting and provocative in its attempt to undermine and offer an alternative to the monopoly that the middle class have appropriated for themselves in the expression of ideas and language use. Dean's approach offers an alternative way of thinking about issues and therefore break the attempted manipulation and self-censorship of thought. As Noam Chomsky pointed out in the September 1996 interview with Andrew Marr of The Independent:

"Children are trained to defer to experts, to repeat what they are told by learned authorities, and to suppress their own doubts and independent conclusions. As children and adults rise up the educational and career ladder they are selected for obedience and subservience (such as the willingness, for example, to put aside reservations and do as they are told for the sake of career advancement). Winners are intelligent and freethinking, but only within certain parameters. These parameters will generally not be recognized by those who 'succeed' but will seem to be "all there is"; a conclusion bolstered by the perennial human tendency to believe what it is convenient to believe." (Noam Chomsky Interview with Andrew Marr, Sept. 1996) This idea is pointed out by Dean in Book One where he makes mention of the intellectual tribalism in philosophy and the requirement to 'toe the line' and 'regurgitate orthodoxy' in order to succeed in a Similarly, Chomsky elaborates on "what we call politics is really a shadow play conducted by corporate power. Parliament is the buffer between the popular desire for democracy and the reality of corporate rule. People, after all, are unlikely to resist that rule so long as politicians (and journalists) succeed in persuading us that it is not there; that in fact it is we who are in control. The mass media plays a crucial role in supporting the democracy illusion by pretending that the arguments presented to us - together with the parties we are allowed to choose from - constitute a free and fair spectrum of choices, which are our choices, and not what is left after state and corporate power have filtered out choices that threaten to interfere. One of the choices deemed unfit for public consumption is the idea that the mass media is a propaganda system." (Noam Chomsky Interview with Andrew Marr, Sept. 1996) Dean makes note of this in the Prologemenon.

Thus it becomes clear that who controls the type of words used, do so for their own ends, and philosophy, the 'type of philosophy' that is taught is no different than politics in this regard. Moreover, thinking is not the same thing as language, but as can be seen by the above examples, language is a powerful tool for influencing thought. It is also true to say that, sociologically, language always reflects a certain class interest, and the class interest that philosophical texts always serve, is that of an elite or ruling minority. Non members of this ruling group are marginalised and excluded from the ideas that philosophy tries to convey because of this exclusivity of language. "Prevailing doctrines could hardly survive were it not for their contribution to "regimenting the public mind every bit as much as an army regiments the bodies of its soldiers"", says Chomsky borrowing from Edward Bernays (a man who worked in Woodrow Wilson's State propaganda agency, the Committee on Public Information. This "regimenting of the public mind" is equally applicable to the 'regimenting of the philosophy student mind', and comes back to the issue of vested interest. The vested interest of which I speak is the propagation of the philosophical ideas held by the lecturers who happen to be running the course in which you enroll. This is intuitively correct, as how can a course be taught if the lecturers do not know the subject they are supposed to teach. But try to introduce an original idea, or propose to take an unorthodox approach, and your grades will suffer because you will have transgressed these unspoken rules of what is acceptable discourse. Again these ideas are supported by examples by Dean in Book One.

he current state of Western philosophical thought cannot be separated from the worldwide attack on Democracy (Democracy in the meaningful sense of individuals who are able to manage their own and collective affairs) that lies rooted "in the power of corporate entities that are totalitarian in internal structure, increasingly interlinked and reliant on powerful states, and largely unaccountable to the public". (Chomsky, Davie Lecture, May 1997) The examples of such a state of affairs rapidly accelerating are numerous: the Victorian (Australia) abolition of compulsory student union registration in order to diffuse the effective demonstration against the dramatic decrease of State funded university placements to be offered, as well as to financial assistance (Austudy) to be offered by the Federal government to students while they study, is one such example. Instead of students showing a united front against erosions to the tertiary education system, those students who were still unionised were effectively marginalised, and more easily dismissed as representatives of a 'minority' as a result of government actions. It is as though the 'Liberal' (right wing) ruling political party of Australia at the time took seriously the problem that Bernays elaborated, "universal suffrage and universal schooling, ... at last even the bourgeoisie stood in fear of the common people", (quoted in; Chomsky, Davie Lecture, May 1997) and as soon as the opportunity came to remove such a threat as universal education posed, the government took it. This example bears out the meaning behind Chomsky's view that, "the reality ... is that state intervention plays a decisive role, as in the past, and the basic outlines of policy are hardly novel. Current versions reflect 'capital's clear subjugation of labor' for more than 15 years, in the words of the business press, which often frankly articulates the perceptions of a highly class-conscious business community, dedicated to class war". (Chomsky, Davie Lecture, May 1997)

It must be understood that as government resources disappear from the tertiary education sector, a necessary consequence must be that tertiary institutions will turn towards the corporate sector to contribute the required funds to support the ongoing running of the university. For this reason the 'class conscious business community' has an increasingly greater impact on the types of learning experience offered at Australian universities. As Chomsky argued in his interview with Tony Marr (September 1996): "children are trained to defer to experts, to repeat what they are told by learned authorities, and to suppress their own doubts and independent conclusions. As children rise up the educational and career ladder they are selected for obedience and subservience (such as the willingness, for example, to put aside reservations and do as they are told for the sake of career advancement). Winners are intelligent and freethinking, but only within certain parameters. These parameters will generally not be recognised by those who 'succeed' but will seem to be 'all there is': a conclusion bolstered by the perennial human tendency to believe what it is convenient to believe".

here can be no doubt that Australia's current political climate is one of rapidly decreasing egalitarianism. A climate were we all are "driven to work by the need for survival; or by material reward, a kind of pathology I [Chomsky] believe, like the kind of pathology that leads some to take pleasure from torturing others" (Lane, T. December 1996). A climate were elected local government representatives are sacked by the State and were community assets such as State schools, utility companies and community libraries are sold off by the State. It is in such times as these that Dean's voice sounds a wake up call to all of us who value truth, integrity, and intellectual honesty.

# PROLEGOMENON

The bourgeois middle class are psychological narcissistic ie they are into power and control, philosophically naive realists ie they think their words hook onto or characterise reality, spiritually they are materialist logical positivist's ie they believe only what they see, sexually they neurotic ie just read Freud, or their expartners, as human beings they are anal retentive, just ask anyone. So why do the middle class bourgeois reckon that they have a monopoly upon what speak is to be use to convey cultural philosophical ideas? Why is it that the only version of reality, or life is the version of the middle class? Why is it that the crap we see on TV, in the newspapers in the tabloids spoken, or written in the idiom or style of the middle class? Why is it that the values, ethics aspirations, metaphysics, ontology that we only have access to are those of the middle class? Why is it that the only allowed speak to be used in universities is middle class speak? All this seems like a middle class attempt to covertly to take over the world to colonise peoples minds with middle class crap. Why do we allow this cultural and mental imperialism to take place. What gives them the self rightchous arrogant 'up themselves' 'cock sure' bourgeois middle class the right to exclude other idioms or colloquial forms of speak from the arena of life or academic discourse. Wittgenstein informed philosophy that philosophy should use the meanings of everyday speak. Surely Wittgenstein did not mean the every day speak of his middle class decorous bourgeois cronies. What about the speak of the wharfie working class, pimp, whore or garbo. Why is their speak excluded from the high brow world of ideas. Why is 'think' a better word than 'reckon'? Why is 'he got it wrong' a better form of expression than 'he spoke crap'? Why is 'he missed the point' better than 'he is a dickhead'? Why is 'he waffles on' better than 'he is a wanker'? Why is 'sycophant' a better word than 'arselicker' or 'brownnoser'? Why is 'arrogant' better than 'up himself' or ' he reckons his shit don't stink? Why is 'intelligent' better than 'brainy'? Why do we say "I think so and so is one of the great thinkers' rather than ' I reckon the sun shines out of his arse'? The middle class are wusses and wimps they will not tell you to your face what they think? They use decorous speak to perfume over their **arseholery**. They don't like hearing what every one knows ie we shit, we stink, we screw our mates wives, we fart. The middle class are afraid of

the everyday speak Wittgenstein valued as a medium of philosophical discourse. This essay is an experiment in expressing sociological truths about philosophy and philosophers in the speak of Wittgenstein's every day speak. It just so happens that my everyday speak is of the working class. Just because the middle class think a form of expression is uncultured it does not mean than the speakers of that idiom have not got a brain in their head ie are not intelligent. It just means that the middle class have not the intelligence to translate it back into their idiom. Much like the ethnocentrism of 'my shit don't stink' middle class anthropologists who felt that because the 'savages didn't speak in their cultured accents that then they where lower on the intelligence evolutionary scale. Two thoughts: 1) don't you think it is beyond chance that the classical poetry of say Japan, India, China and Persia translates into Western middle class speak, 2) isn't beyond chance that reality happens to correspond with middle class speak. What happens to sociology, or psychology, or philosophy and their respective entities of say 'power', 'intelligence',' essence' when it is realised that these words are, and the words of the respective disciplines, but one of many idioms in which reality can be described. Do we now look for 'braininess quotient' [BQ] in place of 'intelligence quotient' [IQ] and a place in the brain where braininess resides, or do we say it all is just a heap of **crap**; as Wittgenstein said the bewitchment of the mind by words. Don't get me wrong I am not saying this because I reckon the 'sun shines out of his arse' but only that he did say some 'shit hot' things even though some of the time he was an 'my shit don't stink' 'wanker'. This essay thus sticks it up those 'up my selves' wanker examiners who when confronted with a piece of work in the idiom of working class speak mark it according to the speak and not to the braininess of the ideas. Those who do this are not to brainy because they think that braininess measured by the speak used; in their case middle class speak. We only have to look at the speak of middle class philosophers to know that one can speak middle class and still be as 'thick as two brick' ie not very brainy.

# THE END OF PHILOSOPHERS



"What makes one regard philosophers half mistrustfully and half mockingly is not... thier childishment and childlikeness... but that they display altogether insufficient honesty, while making a mighty and virtuous noise as soon as the problem of truthfulness is even remotely touched on. They pose as having discovered and attained their real opinions through the self-evolution of a cold pure, divinely unperturbed dialectic...while what happens at bottom is that a prejudice...is defended by them with reasons sought after the event." (Nietzsche, 1990, p.36.)

"Thinking is only the relationship of these drives [desires and passions] to one another...The world seen from within [is] 'will to power 'and nothing else" (Nietzsche, 1990, p.66)

"...life is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker suppression severity, imposition of ones own forms... exploitation...[ie] 'will to power'." (Nietzsche, 1990, p.194) So what is the nature of philosophy? What is it's essential defining characteristic? What is that which makes it philosophy and not sociology, psychology, history or even physics, or mathematics? This essay argues that objects of the world such as the ones just listed are made up of contradictory elements or characteristics., they are in effect coincidentia oppositoriums. To characterise something completely is to document it's contradictory elements. The problem of life is that one element of an objects complexity is focused upon and this element is seen to characterise the object. In other words an objects nature is a product of the perspective, interpretation or hermeneutics of the observer. A complete characterisation involves the amalgamating of the totality of perspective through which it is viewed. So what is the nature of philosophy. Philosophical text will tell you that it is the 'love of wisdom' (Barnes, 1987, p.12) or philosophy is the use of 'reasoned argument' (Flew, 1979, p.1x) Once again its nature is dependent upon ones perspective. Now though these characterisation of philosophy seem to be true there are other elements that go to make up its nature and these elements have nothing to do with the 'love of wisdom' or 'reasoned argument'. These elements are sociological in nature. This essays perspective on the nature of philosophy is thus sociologically orientated. To any prospective student who wants to be admitted into philosophies 'hall of fame' there is a path to follow which lectures aint the **balls** to tell you. This path is the path of 'arselickiing', 'crawling' 'toeing the line' ie the human world of the human animal - the political creature. It should be born in mind that the sociological truths about philosophy are also truths about sociology itself, psychology, anthropology, history and even science. In the case of science read Mulkay (Mulkay 1979), or Barnes & Edge (Barnes & Edge,

1982). or even Kuhn (Kuhn, 1970). So what makes the sociology of philosophy different from the other sociologies such that philosophy has a distinct sociological nature. Nothing! The characteristic of 'love of wisdom' 'reasoned argument' could likewise be applied to any discipline. So if all the disciplines have the same things in common what then is the essential characteristics which mark one discipline of from another. Some would say only the fact that there is a word for that discipline and a words for the other disciplines. A trivial point some word say. Now Jakobson makes the point that words change through process of "...assimilation and contrasting, linking and detaching, and structuring by correlation of the similar/contrasting and contiguos/ remote (Graham, 1992, p.7) Graham asks in such a case "...we may wonder why reason has ever entertained ambitions above even its high station to operate exculsivly with terms spun out of its self" (Graham, 1992, p.7) Even apart from the changablity of a words meaning or essence the important point is that once we begin to seek out a things essence and delve into the word the essence retreats from like the ever retreating horizon did to those early explorers of the seas. In other words upon analysis or looking the things essence cannot be found. Now with the non-existence of an essence the object become lost. With logic demonstration of the non-existence of the object logi has nothing to work with and logic invadites its self as an epistemic condition of truth by the very laws it used to make the paradoxical demonstration (see demonstration). Thus 'philosophy' is over, it is dead. As Nietzsche proclaimed the death of god I proclaim the death of philosophy. Philosophy has no defining characteristics thus it does not exist it is dead. Logic has no object to work and ends up in a aselfe generated paradox thus reasoned argument' is dead. But nevertheless student if you want to become a philosophical icon then knowledge of the human animal is essential. A Knowledge of the sociological nature of what goes by the name of philosophy will lay you in go stead.

If one wants to know how to do philosophy then one should read about Nietzsche's 'will to power', Gadarma's 'tradition', Foucualt's 'archaeology of knowledge' and 'genealogy', as well as Rorty's 'cuturalism' or 'epistemological behaviourism'. Your lecturer will get you to read these scholars but will not admit that what they say is applicable to him and his academic life. Little though will he tell you that the reality of what they say will have a great bearing on your own academic career. Philosophers are like other academics. The sociologist will not admit the findings of sociology to itself, or its own discipline of sociology. The psychologist will not admit that it is also suffering from the hang ups that its discipline characterises. Wittgenstein, what an icon, what a god argued that we should speak the language of the everyday by this I feel he did not mean the every day of the bourgeois but perhaps the wharfie, garbo, fishwife, thug ,pimp, or whore what is to follow translates the language of the nicey nice sweet smell, 'great looking, great sounding academic bourgeois in to the language of the of the every day the world of real people; people who **smell**, people who's **underwear** is **piss** stained. The great sharfter of the world Nietzsche shafted the world by laying bear its underbelly, but Nietzsche himself chose to do the sharfting in the language of the bourgeois literate and thus while being considered 'extreme' is always nevertheless considered one of the cultured one of us by the academic middle class bourgeois wankers. What would be the result if Nietzsche wrote in the language of the German proletariat, obscurity perhaps. Surely 'crap' 'bullshit' convey much better what the nicy nice words of 'inconsistent'

'incoherent' really amount to. Surely 'arse licking', 'sharfting up the arse' convey more clearly what 'the will to power' connotates. Nevertheless back to the point.

Even though the above scholars arguments are philosophically unsound- because they are philosophically arrived at ie by inference- they nevertheless capture the sociological and political aspects of the 'real life' 'on the ground nature' 'underbelly world' of philosophy. In other words though the philosophers talk **crap**- don't excuse the language because this essay will be fall of such colloquial expressions because this essay, apart from other things, is to take philosophical languages away from the monopoly of the bourgeois and give it back, to as they would say, the uncultured riff raff.- their crap nevertheless mirrors the farting, **BO** smelling real world of competing ego's, vanity in other words the back stabbing, **arse licking** world of the academics themselves; a world characterised by Nietzsche and Foucault by the nice, decorous sweet smelling word 'power'. If one does not believe that the above talk **crap** then I suggest one read Habermas pointing out the crap of Gadamer (Hoy, 1982. p.117-128), Gadamer pointing out the crap of Habermas (ibid, p.117-128) Habermas pointing out the crap of Foucault ( Habermas, 1995, pp.238-294), Habermas pointing out the **crap** of Nietzsche (ibid, pp.83-105)., Wittgenstein pointing out the **crap** of everyone (Wittgenstein, 1953) .Putnam pointing out the crap of Wittgenstein (Putnam, 1985, p 115-126), Putnam pointing out the crap of Rorty (Putnam, 1995, pp.342-346), Putnam pointing out the crap of Habermas (Putnam, 1995, p.151, pp.232-233). Putnam pointing out the crap of Putnam (Putnam, 1985, p..110-114, 1995, p.v) Haack pointing out the **crap** of Rorty ( Haack, 1995, pp.182-194) Kulp pointing out the **crap** of Rorty, (Kulp, 1992, p.169-183),

McNay pointing out the **crap** of Foucault, (McNay, 1994). Read any book about philosophy every philosophers finds fault with other philosophers; Locke with Descartes, Hume with Locke, Kant with Hume, Hegel with Kant, Marx with Hegel, the Frankfurt school with Marx, Habermas with the Frankfurt school, Putnam with Habermas, Putnam with Rorty, Rorty with Putnam it goes on and on they all find that the others speaks **crap**. The question is why do we listen to any of them?. Read Dostoevesky's chapter 'The Grand Inquisitor' in his '<u>The Brothers Karamazov'</u> we are all sheep needing to be told what to think and do, as the existentialist noted a long time ago we have not the balls to take responsibility for our freedom. But to be fair most of us have accepted the myth of 'cogent argument', of rationality. We listen to philosophers because they tell us that the measure of all things is rationality, but beware the fact of the matter is as the truth was known in circa 440 BC as Protagoras noted 'Man is the measure of all things'.

It is an accepted opinion of sociologically naive philosophical students that all that is required to carry and argument is the 'cogency' or 'rationality' of the argument. The student soon finds out that this is not the case, that ineffect this belief is a myth. Ask any post graduate student or for that matter any **areslicking** student and they will tell you that what is required in passing. It is the writing of something that ones supervisor agrees with as well as the finding of examiners who happen to agree with your arguments. Ayer makes note of an intersting historical fact regarding Wittgenstein and Russell (Ayer, 1982, pp.109-110).. Wittgenstein sent Russell a copy of what was to become the **Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus** Russell claiming that it solved all the

philosophical problems that Wittgenstein had discussed with Russell.. One of the points of common agreement was in regard to the fact of Russells idea of logical atomism (Urmson, 1992, p.328). Russell was impressed by this work and he wrote an introduction to this work. Now Wittgenstein submitted this work for his doctorate at Cambridge. When it comes to being examined for his doctorate at Cambridge one of the examiners was Russell himself. All I can say is draw your own conclusions, but where is the objectivity? In effect the factor which enables one to be a member of a philosophical community ie at least a Doctorate is not that of cogency, rational 'argument' but political. In other words a sociology of philosophy will give a clearer understanding to a potential student about how one gets ones qualifications than the acceptance of the disciplines myth of 'rational argument' Any one with half a brain would know that one does not do women's studies and expect to do well if one praises men in their essays. One does not expect to do well in a cognitive psychology department writing or believing a Freudian perspective. Similarly one should not expect to do well writing a foundationalist essay in a Rorytian or anti-foundationalist department. Similarly again don't write and anti-essentialist or ant-metaphysical tract which is to be marked disciplines myth of 'rational argument' Any one with half a brain would know that one does not do women's studies and expect to do well if one praises men in their essays. One does not expect to do well in a cognitive psychology department writing or believing a Freudian perspective. Similarly one should not expect to do well writing an essay which is not in the speak of one's examiner.

Take note you stupid student that no matter what you write on epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, or even ethics, whether this be your own original ideas, or your assessment of others ideas if the examiner does not like you, is jealous of you, has some one else in mind lets say for a scholarship, or is screwing his/her favourite student then he/she will have no difficulty in **arseholeing** your argument. No matter what you say or what you say someone else says it is the nature of philosophy that some philosopher from Plato to say Putnam has argued differently. No matter what you say, it is the nature of philosophy that there will be a criticism of it somewhere. Even it by chance there isn't a criticism in the corpus of philosophical argument don't worry if your examiner is out to get you he/she will come up with a criticism of your views.. But note student the opposite is true also if your examiner thinks the sun shines out of your arse, or in the case of a female we could say some other hairy orifice place, then no matter what you say he/she will find some where support for your views. Note student that if the examiner is intellectually lazy but nevertheless wants to arsehole you then the method is to find fault with your spelling, essay structure, punctuation writing style, or referencing.

In the Anglo-American tradition there is the 'right way of speaking' or orthodoxy's of pragmatism and analytical philosophy. In the European tradition there are the 'right way of speaking' or orthodoxy's of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Philosophical texts are placed in one or other of these main traditions. If one reads an Anglo-American philosophical text all that one gets is ether pragmatism or analytical philosophy, with in some cases a perfunctory mention of the other tradition thrown in . The same is true of

the European tradition. Just look at the index of Habermas's 'The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity' or his 'Theory of Communicative Action' and see how many pragmatists or analytic philosophers are mentioned. Similarly look at Putnam's 'Words & Life' or his 'Realism with a Human Face' and see how often Gadarma, Derrida, Foucualt or even Habermas are mentioned. Consult Dancy's 'Introduction to **Contemporary Epistemology'** to see how little Gadarma, Foucault, Habermas, or Derrda are mentioned. The situation is admittedly different with Rorty in his book 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' where phenomenology and hermeneutics, Derrida, Foucault and Gadarma are given some space ; but given the nature of Rortys anti-foundationalism this is some what to be expected. The point is that if one were to write from an Anglo-American perspective pragmatism, analytical philosophy on a European concern ie hermeneutics or phenomenology in a European university full of Heideggerian or Foucaultian or Gadarmerian or Habermasian scholars one would be in serious trouble. No they claim!. I say that practically any supervisor that accepted the student's thesis if honest would admit that a lot of trouble would be had in finding sympathetic examiners who would not criticise the 'cogent arguments' from their philosophical prejudice. That sympathetic appraisal of the said thesis would be hard to find is given credence from the fact that the scholar have adopted a point of view for all sorts of reasons ie political, sociological, or just plain economic The agreeing of an alternative point of view means finding fault with one own view and this is precluded from the start by the very fact that the scholar is a scholar of an alternative point of view. An interesting admission of university parochialism is noted by J.Ree in the introduction to 'The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers where he

notes "...the linguistic movement centred in Oxford in the 1950s which was inspired by the later Wittgenstein... The main thing that united the Oxford philosophers was their ambivalence about the project of philosophical **analysis**, particularly as interpreted by logical positivism... they rejected its cut -and- dried scientism and its faith in technicalities and formal logic and they felt uneasy about its condensation towards the classics of philosophy" (J.O.Urmson & J.Ree, 1992, p.x1). Pity any student that was a logical positivist at OXford. On this point student it makes things easier (like at OXford in the 50s) if you adopt the language, ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, and perhaps ethics of the current fashion in philosophy; like perhaps the 80s-90s fashion of antifoundationalsm. This is because as, Putnam notes, "...some philosophers go overboard whenever there is a new fad or fashion in philosophy" (Putnam, 1985, p.66) Similarly Ree points out the philosophical predilection for fashion when he notes that the book, 'The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, attempted to "...range beyond the confines of British and American philosophical fashions" (ibid, p.x1) On the idea of philosohical fashions traditions and university coteria Hamlyn points out the chain of discipleship at Harvard when he states "the most influential aspect of his [James] however was the pragmatism. Apart from Dewey, C.I.Lewis shows the great influence of this trend in thought.... Lewis was a Harvard man and something of the same philosophical spriit although will modifications was handed on ...to W.V.Quine at Harvard" ) Hamlyn, 1987, p.287). Papineau notes the tribalism and inculsivity of the tradions when he states that "Hegel and Nietzsche have no place in the analytic pantheon and such twentieth-century philsophical movements as phenomenoly, hermeneutics and structualism are regarded as unimportant. "( Papineau, 1992, p.11) Just to keep the

balance and not to make one think that it is only the Anglo-American's who are tribalistic Rorty makes the oint that "logical empiricism and later anayltic philosophy were dismissed by most German (and many French) philosophers as not 'transcendental' and therefore neither methodologically sound nor properly edifying" (Rorty, 1979, p.162). Take note students the first animal clone may have been created in 1997, but academies have been creating clones for centuries; namely students who are the mirror image of them selves, what vanity, what ego the best form of flattery is someone adopting someone else's ontology thus we could say that academics are the most vain and the most egotist.

The presentation of a philosophical argument is made easier if the argument is in the tradition of current opinion or orthodoxy all that one has to do then is find a 'really good 'quote from one of the icons of orthodoxy to justify the argument being given. The situation becomes quite dangerous when the philosophical argument is outside the 'current way of thinking' because then one cannot then find quotes from the icons to justify the arguments. If one says something which is 'new' or is a different way of seeing, or should I dare to say disagrees with an icon, or even worse accuses the icon of being wrong then one is in a very precarious position unless one is an icon one self. The way out of such a situation is to find a quote from an icon to the job for you, but don't dare say you said it with out the back, because 9 times out of 10 an examiner is so in awe of an icon ,and the orthodoxy around it, that be assured your claim will go uncriticised because most examiners have not the balls to attack a member of the 'philosophies hall of

fame' get Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Rorty, Gadarma or Foucault to do it for you; but to be really on the safe side spend some time to find a supporting quote from an icon of the orthodoxy ones examiner belongs to. In philosophy it is not so much as what is said as when it is said and who said it. Philosophers seem to pay more attention to what is said the more important the philosopher is who says it. Poor Ted Nerk no matter how profound or 'rational' his arguments or thoughts are being a no body I am sorry to say he would go unnoticed An interesting admission of this worship of what icon's say is made by Putnam. The rejection of the notion of apriority was taken notice of because an icon, as distinct from someone from the lower ranks, put forward the idea ie Quine. Putnam notes in this regard "...Quine is a philosopher of historic importance. He is of historic importance because he was the first philosopher of top rank [note not first philosopher but first of the 'top rank' both to reject the notion of apriority and at least to sketch an intelligible conception of methodology without apriority." (Putnam, 1985, pp.87-88) What would happen if you student had Quine's idea before Quine had? Being of low rank who would of listened and who could you of quoted to impress those icons of the top rank.

It is maintained that all that is required to carry an argument is its 'rationality' thus the way to support a prejudice is to claim that the argument in question is not rational. Now this essay is taking the dangerous path of undercutting the last bastion of a philosopher's epistemology or foundation for truth namely rationality itself. With the demise of rationality philosophy is over and philosophers are out of a prestigious highly paid job. Watch the sociological phenomena of frenzy. Philosophers will go to any length to

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maintain the foundation, support of their egos, income ,and perhaps the only thing they have to pull the birds with. With out their intellectual **wank** philosophers are a pretty boring lot and for that matter with it also - a fact hidden from the philosophical and sociological naive.

Philosophers when they state an argument do so in such an arrogant 'cock sure' 'I am right' attitude. On reads such pompous sounding works as Kant's 'The Critique of Pure Reason' or Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and one is amazed how sure, how arrogant the writers are of the truths of their works. But then as time goes on they begin to modify again with such arrogance truths they put forward with arrogance in earlier works. Wittgenstein with his **Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'** arrogantly felt that this work had solved all philosophical problems (Urmson, 1992, p.327) can we really give much brainyness to such a **wanker** who though obviously a legend in his own mind feels so **cock sure** of his shall we say 'intelligence'. Nevertheless this highly regarded, because of his 'intelligence,' thinker in his latter works he again arrogantly felt that the thinking of that work was wrong (ibid, p.328) Putnam in his 'The Meaning of Meaning' arrogantly states that " it isn't logically possible that water isn't H2O" (Putnam 1975, p.233), but in his 'Realism and Reason' says it is (Putnam 1983, p.63). Putnam in **<u>Realism with a Human Face</u>** argues that he did not think through the consequence...[of] what [he] wrote in 'The Meaning of Meaning''' (Putnam, 1992, p.69). Again Putnam in Words and Life 'argues against a theory of truth that he argued for in 'Realism with a Human Face'. (Putnam 1995, p.v). In the work 'Words and Life' Conant notes that Putnam in this work will in "...one essay devote itself to tearing out individual pieces

from the overall puzzle that another happily assumes still remains firmly in place. (ibid,p.x1). After this how can we take the arrogant espousing of these philosophers with any seriousness? How can they take themselves seriously? We have Marxist and 'Critical theorist' philosophers disparaging, and criticising the bourgeois and capitalism, yet we find them espousing all this in those citadels of capitalism and the bourgeois ie those institutions which perpetuate and maintain the very things these hypocrites disparage ie universities a bit hypocritical one would say. I suppose they are like those men hating **dike** feminist who hate men so much that they are prepared to work in that bastion of male patriarchy structures and male thinking ie universities. Ain't the Anglo-American pragmatist and analytical philosophers lucky. Because they are sociological stupid and have no philosophical social theory, like the Europeans, they don't have the problem of putting their money where there mouth is ie having the **balls** to practice what they preach - putting their **arse** on the line-; it so safe to be embroiled in modal logic. So I ask why do we take them seriously? Why do we listen? Because our lectures say these philosophers are icons. But I suppose it really is because they tell us that because they are from OXford, or Melbourne University, or the Australian National University, or Harvard of Gottingham, or the Sorbourne they are really 'brainy' and their 'shit don't stink' and what they have to say is 'really important', a bit like salesmen selling themselves, all their pomposity, importance, is dependent upon as believing their telling us that they are important; it all comes crashing down if we realise it is all **crap**. If these icons arguments are fallible, should I say just down wrong, which some have the balls to point out, why are their invalid arguments considered worthy when Ted Nerk if stated the same point of view would not be given the time of day. Perhaps it is because Ted

does not belong to the 'old boys club' of mutual backslapping wankers. But perhaps it is because Ted is not an 'old boy' of OXford, or Melbourne University, or the Australian National University, or Cambridge, or Gottingham or Harvard; once again the solution to a philosophical problem is found in sociology. On the point of being wrong. If you are wrong you are **arseholed** is ignored but this dose not happen with philosophical icons. Their iconness or godheadness is not due to their arguments, which are just down wrong, but some other reason. Putnam notes that "there are some philosophers in the history of philosophy whose importance does not very much depend upon their being right" (Putnam, 1985, p.88). Putnam does not tell us what it depends on. Perhaps the argument is like this Descartes open up a new way of looking at philosophy but his way was wrong, Locke offered a solution to the problems of Descartes but he was wrong, Kant offered a solution to Humes problems, but he was wrong according to Quine's critique of the synthetic and analytic distinction, and Quine has problem according to Putnam (Putnam, 1985, p.87-97, pp.127-132, 1995, pp.245-263). So it goes on and on, each offers wrong solutions to someone else's wrong solutions. So why are they icons perhaps the answer is more sociological than philosophical. The moral is student tell the philosophical community in some pompous sounding tome that you are going to solve in this tome, some great philosophical problem or alter the whole course of philosophical debate, like Descartes did, it dose not matter that your arguments are wrong just state that you are going to do this monumental task. I will give you an insight student. If one looks at philosphy you will see that it is made up of dichotomie ie empticism/rationalsim; realism/idealism; phenomenology/ existentialism; Plationism /Aistotoleanism; European/ Anglo-American; foundationalism/anti-foudationlism etc Now if you want to become

famous what you do is find and eara of philosophy that has not got an antithesis and create it ie what about create the antithesis of ?????. On the other hand you could do what Kant did and create a synthesi of a dichotomy in his case empiricism/rationalsim; he called it transcendental idealism But bear in mind like those of low rank who came before Quine no one with probably listen until you become of the top rank. How do you become of the 'top rank' this is a mystery to the sociologically naive; ask your lecturer perhaps he will have the **balls** to tell that one of the ways is to go to a pompous 'old boys' university and toe the line. As a point of note it is interesting that philosophers take themselves so seriously. Take Russell pompous sounding book 'Principia Mathimatica or Kant's 'The Critique of Pure Reason' or Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-**Philosophicus'.** Could it be because what they think they are doing is so important that that consequently makes them important, or is because they think their **shit don't stink** what makes what they do then so important. Whatever it is obvious that a lot of ego is a necessary and sufficent condition to do philosophy and be a philosopher. You say student arnt I opening myself up to being burt at the stake, tared and feathereded, castrated, or just down and out **arseholed** by philosophers for aresholing their Gods. No I say!! You have not been listening!!! These wanker philosophers only pay attention to philosophers whose **shit dont stink**. Because I am a no body they want pay attention or care less with what I say. Take note student they all **piss** in each other pocket in public and generally in print and in public stick together like **shit**. But we know the real world student don't we. Just look at the politics of your own lives and you will now the politics of the world of the academics, two faceness, backstabbing, jealousies, arseholery, and down right **prickness**. No you say? How do you pull a root I say? I bet your really

honest. I bet you would not backdoor your mate and **screw** his/her root. Of cause not you say!!! But we all know you would not trust your mate and your mate would not trust you. Philosophically we are all solipsists, psychologically narcissistic. We think every one else is like our self we project our own **prickness** on the world and assume everyones a **prick** like us. Look to your self students and you will know it all.

What does the backsliding of philosophers and there "not thinking through the consequences of an argument" indicate. It indicates two things 1) that we can never be certain that they will not discomfirm any thing that they my believe now in some future time. and 2) that we cannot accept philosophers arguments that their arguments are rational. Stein in his book <u>Without Good Reason</u> notes that "anyone who confidently asserted either that humans are rational or humans are irrational does so on the basis of incomplete empirical evidence and unsupported conceptual claims in other words, she has taken a strong stand on a question of human rationality without good reason" (Stein

1996, p.277)

# **BOOK TWO**

# THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

"Once the validity of inference [as a foundation for truth] was denied...perception [as a foundation for truth] could not stand for long on it's own feet." (K. N.Jayatilleke, 1980, p.89).

"In logic there are no morals. Every one is at liberty to build up his own logic ie his own form of language, as he wishes." (Carnap, 1937, p.52)

Putnam in his '**Realism and Reason'** argues that there is at least one *a priori* truth namely his minimal definition of the principle of contradiction ie "not every statement is both true and false' (Putnam, 1985, p.100-101). This minimal definition is obfucatory because it hides the real issue. There must be some criterion of truth or theory of truth to distinguish true from false. Now whether the theory of truth is pargmatic, coherance, correspondance semantic or prosentential the epistemic comditions upon which these theories are built and justifed are the principles of logic that is the law of contradiction and its Collaroy the law of identify ie A is not B because A and B have individual distinguishing characters namely an essence. Consequently we shall see that the minimal definition of contradiction is wrong if we tell you what the criterion of truth and falsity really is. Because some statements are both true and false under this highlighted minimal definition.. The example which comes to mind is the statement that 'a quantum of light is a particle' This is true from the perspective of the of the photo-electric theory of Einstein but not true from the theory of interference and diffraction. The fact of the matter is the 'quantum' is paradoxically both a particle and a wave a *coincidentia* oppositorium in its total uninteracting characterisation. It is an experiment which brings out one aspect of this totality. From the minimal definition of contradiction this statement ' a 'quantum' is paradoxically both a particle and a wave a *coincidentia oppositorium* in its total uninteracting characterisation' is both true and false. True because it characterises the uninteracting nature of the 'quantum' but false because of the law of identify which says that the 'quantum' cannot be both a particle and a wave.

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Now Rorty with his culturalism will now jump in and say 'there you are there are no epistemic condition and no truth' all is explained by his epistemological behaviourism ie society tells us what is true or false. If we accept this Rorty is faced with the same problem of the rationalists and that is the laws of logic ie law of contradiction and law of identity, which he uses because society say to use them, reduce to reductio ad absurdums. Consequently the very principles Rorty uses reduce his statements to crap. An example. It is agreed that a proposition is either true or false [ which Rorty would say is a societal idea]. Thus if Rorty says 'truth is an empty notion' (Putnam, 1995, p.331) then he cannot be saying this with a proposition, which must be either true or false according to societies dictates, so what is he using to convey his speech; he really cannot be saying anything because he cannot use a proposition. If he happens to be using a nonpropositional way to communicate then he is still reduced to **crap**; because the idea that 'truth is an empty notion' is either true in which case the idea is false or it is false in which case it is true. But if Rorty still claims he is neither talking truth or falsity then I am sorry I don't know then what the idea 'truth is an empty notion' means.

### THESIS

Hookway notes that "...it is necessary that 3+4=7, that a statement and its negation are not both possible, or that vixens are female foxes." (Hookway, 1988, p.110). These claim are superficial because unless we can say what 7, or 4, or 3 are or what is female or what is male we cannot even begin to use logic. These statements assume that these entities have defining characteristics which mark them of and distinguish them from each other ; in other words they assume an object has an essence ie its defining characteristic. Now if we take it as an axiom that there are essences and the above entities exist then we are left with the fact that because of the idea of essence a statement and its negation are both true eventuates. It eventuates at the most fundamental stage of logic at logics foundation in its requirement that there must be an object ie a p and a q for the logic p.q or p&q to work. This results in logic not being an epistemic condition for truth by logics own principles.

Now where the fact that a statement and its negation are both true comes in is that logic simultaneously affirms the statement "there is an essence" and simultaneously denies that "there is an essence"; both statement are simultaneously true. The way this happens is not via one syllogistic argument proving an essence, say in the case of Kripke, and another syllogistic argument proving the non-existence of essence, say Ayer, but by logic in one argument simultaneously affirming and negating the statement "there is an essence". Example If an object, atom, horse, is identical with its essence then the thing characterised, atom, horse, ceases to be characterised because it has coalesced with its own characteristics. Conclusion the notion of essence leads to a contradiction therefore essence does not exist. . Here the essence is denied but the idea of an essence ie of the words in the above example is required to make the logical deduction.

This thesis argues that the principles of inference guarantee no certainty in regard to the 'relation of ideas' ie conceptual word play or 'matters of fact' or in other words the empirical world. With the undermining of the foundations for inferential argument inferential argument becomes untenable. Consequently foundationalism in any of its forms, anti-foundationalism and the whole of philosophy is untenable. With this undermining of inference whether the principles of inference are due to convention (Carnap, Ayer and possibly Wittgenstein), following rules (Wittgenstein), what society stipulates (Rorty) or laws of thought (Kant, the early Wittgenstein), becomes irrelevant when logic however it is justified cannot be an epistemic condition for truth; however truth itself is defined.

#### FIRST PART

To my mind philosophy has lost sight of the central question which must be answered before all other philosophical questions. Though philosophers ask "how is inference or the principles of logic an epistemic condition they don't go to the crux of the matter. They right tomes of works all missing the essential question. Philosophers argue about whether logic is based on convention ( Carnap, Ayer) is logic a matter of following rules (Wittgenstein) is logic pre-conventional (Quine) . Philosophers argue about 1) whether the connectives, variables, predicates of propositional, or predicative logic

correspond to any thing in ordinary langue 2) whether the formal languages of say propositional or predicative logic are applicable to natural languages 3) whether logical techniques can be applied to every day speech. Philosophers argue about identity ie 1). whether Leibniz's laws are possible 2) whether the principle of the 'identity of indisernables' is possible) Philosophers argue about essentialism 2) anti-essentialism. Ayer and Quine argue that individual things cannot have necessary properties. Kripke, Putnam and Wiggins argue that they can Philosophers endlessly debate the questions of 1) universals and 2) particulars. To my mind this is all irrelevant unless the essential question is asked. It does not matter whether there is or is not an essence. It does not matter whether logic hooks onto language or the world. None of these question matter if logic is not and cannot be an epistemic condition. What we need is a self-critique of reason. At the very first what matters is the realisation that logic needs an object in order for its connectives, variables and laws to operate. On this point Adorno agrees as he states "...identity is inherent in thought itself... to think is to identify. (Adorno, 1973, p.5). On this point Nietzsche in <u>Beyond Good and Evil</u> tells us that "...materialistic atomism ... is one of the best-refuted things there are; and perhaps no scholar in Europe is still unscholarly today as to accord it serious significance....since Boscovich taught us to abjure belief in the last thing of earth that stood firm belief in substance [essence], in matter, in the earth-residuum and particle atom..." (Nietzsche, 1973, p.43.). Now if logic 1) negates the very object, it needs for it's existence, which this thesis will argue; and 2) ends in a paradox by negating the very thing ie object it must assume to exist to make the negating demonstration, then logic has no foundation upon which to

# build inferences which this thesis will argue. Thus the questions addressed by philosophers above become mere superfluities.

Logics negation of the object of logic in fact undermines logics own value as an epistemic condition. As Habermas says of logic turned in on itself "identify thinking turned against itself becomes pressed into continual self-denial and allows the wounds it inflicts on itself and its objects to be seen" (Habermas, 1995, p.196). This undermining is due to logic violating it own law of non-contradiction. By the law of non-contradiction something cannot be A and not A simultaneously if it is then by the law of contradiction it cannot be a truth claim. Logic, in my demonstration, requires an essence, say A, for its applications but logic negates this essence is not A, the very thing it requires to make the negation; thus a paradox. On this point of self-referential reason ending in paradox Habermas points out, in regard to Adornos attack on essence, "the totalising self-critique of reason gets caught within a performative contradiction..." (Habermas, 1995, p.186) Now because logic is paradoxical, by its own laws it cannot itself be an account or truth, or give an account of truth; it thus is not an epistemic condition. Consequently if logic is from the start caught within a 'performative contradiction' then from the start logic cannot be an epistemic condition thus we cannot even begin to philosophies. So the central question is "in terms of logic is logic illogical?". If logic is, in terms of its own standards, not an epistemic condition because, when it turns in upon itself in selfcriticism, it becomes paradoxical then all philosophy past and present and future is worthless. Now though Ayer makes the point that ".. the negation of a law of logic is logically impossible." (Ayer, 1991, p.184). this dose not preclude the possibility that the laws of logic lead to paradoxically logic logically negating its own foundations ie an essence. Now it is the demonstrating of this possibility that this part seeks to show. Thisart will attempt to show that, because logic relies upon the notion of an essential object for its existence, the principles of logic ie law of contradiction and law of identity negates this essential object logic. Thus logic makes itself untenable as an epistemic condition for truth. My argument is made up of two parts, because logic require that there is an object ie he law of identity states that x=x, then. 1) that is x cannot be found consequently then logic breaks down and 2) logic negates x as such logic undermines itself and cannot be an epistemic condition for truth; truth in the sense of empirical truth and truth in the sense of the truths of the relations between ideas.

#### **DEMONSTRATION: THE END OF PHILOSOPHY**

This section has three parts: 1) The notion of essence or Identity; 2) The empirical negation of essence in regard to 'matters of fact'; 3) The logical negation of essence in regard to 'relations of ideas'.

#### THE NOTION OF ESSENCE OR IDENTITY

Putnam argues that logic has no metaphysical presuppositions at all (Putnam,1995, p.247) On this point Adorno would disagree. The metaphysical presupposition upon which logic is built is the notion of the object and identity. As Adorno noted "...identity is inherent in
thought itself... to think is to identify. (Adorno, 1973, p5) Logic requires an object upon which the laws of logic can then work. The notion of an 'object' is completely metaphysical. Logic must use the notion of an object in its demonstrations, but logic itself demonstrates that the notion of 'object' leads to the *reductio ad absurdum* of logic. Paradoxically logic shows that whether there is an x or y or whether x is y or x is not y that ineffect there is nothing x or y to affirm and there is nothing x or y to negate. In other words logic logically demonstrates that the object cannot be found and as such demonstrates that logic logically negates the very thing which makes it possible namely an object; a paradox..

The logical demonstration of the illogicality of logic takes the following form. Philosophy accepts without question that freedom from contradiction is a necessary condition of truth. The demonstration which will follow will demonstrates that because logic is logically illogical. In other words by its own claims as to what constitutes truth paradoxically logic cannot be a condition of truth. ie if its claims are true then they are not true and if they are not true then they must be true.

The law of contradiction states that something cannot be A and B simultaneously. A and B are different objects with distinct identities which mark them of from one another and other distinct and different objects. Thus the law of contradiction relies upon the law of identity. If there are no distinct identities then there is nothing for the law of contradiction to work with. Logic must assume that there are identities or objects but logic

demonstrates that there are no identities or objects. Now the paradox is logic denies the very thing logic needs to make the denial ie an object, thus a *reductio ad absurdum*.

The law of contradiction and law of identity only requires that there are objects with distinct identities or shall I say essences ie something which makes it what it is and nothing else without which it would not be what it is. Putnam's claim, that "Certainly, the Aristotelian insight that objects have structure (essence) is right, provided we remember that what counts as the structure (essence) of something is relative to the ways in which we interact with it (Putnam, 1995, p78). Now this claim is beside the point for the point is no matter what we see the essence to be this concept when used in logic reduces it to a *reductio*. This does not then mean that we can do without the notion of an object for in order for us to think ie use logic we must have an object; but remember logic logically negate the very thing it need for its own existence. Also the debates in philosophy as regard to question for or against essentialism such as Kripke; Wigggens; Putnam, etc miss the point. They miss the point because even if essentialsim can be demonstrated we have the problem that logic will logically negate the notion of essence. Also if essentialism is rejected we still have the problem that the laws of logic require an essence as Adorno pointed out.

The demonstration of the negation of essence is made up of two parts.. The first part uses the empirical notion of change or causality to logically negate the notion of essence.. The second part uses the notion essence to negate the object.

# FIRST PART: THE EMPIRICAL NEGATION OF ESSENCE IN REGARD TO 'MATTERS OF FACT'

If an object is, say an atom, what it is, due to its unalterable essence, then by the very fact that objects do change ie atoms undergo radioactive decay, then objects cannot have an unalterable essence. If an object changes it must cease to be the original object and become a new object. Now because everything changes, as Heraclitus pointed out circa 540 BC, an object cannot have an unchangeable defining characteristic thus the object has no distinguishing identity. Now without an identity the object ceases to exist. Thus logic has denied the very thing it deeds for the demonstration namely an object. We can avoid this consequence by adopting Humes critique of causality which basically denies that causality is a necessary law of nature, or similarly we can adopt Parmenides notion, circa 540 BC, that nothing changes.

# SECOND PART: THE LOGICAL NEGATION OF ESSENCE IN REGARD TO 'RELATIONS OF IDEAS'.

What this section will show is that because logic relies upon the notion of an essential object for its existence and because of the principles of logic ie law of contradiction and law of identity logic makes itself untenable as an epistemic condition for truth.

Now with the ideas of Hume and Parmenides we may be able to escape from the paradoxical consequences. But by purely using logic and not resorting to empirical knowledge we are still faced with the paradox. An object has two ways it can be characterised . 1) The object, say atom, is characterised by its essence. Which in the case of the atoms the number of sub-atomic particles. In another way the horse is characterised by its essence DNA or 2) the object, say atom, and its essence are identical. In this case the atom is its essence the number of sub-atomic particles . In another way the horse and its essence DNA are identical. Both alternatives end in the logical consequence that the object does not exist because it cannot have an essence or defining distinguishing characteristic.

**CASE 1) In case one the essence will be different from its object and thus its ceases to be an essence**. The horse being distinguished from its essence will be different from its essence. This is easily seen. The living breathing horse, in my yard, is different from the molecular chain making up the molecule DNA; inefect they are structurally different. The same goes for the atom say H2O. H2O is structurally different from the quantum mechanical wave equations which describe the sub-atomic particles which is its essence.

CASE 2) If an object, atom, horse, is identical with its essence then the thing characterised, atom, horse, ceases to be characterised because it has coalesced with its own characteristics. Conclusion the notion of essence leads to a contradiction therefore essence does not exist. . Here the essence is denied but the idea of an essence ie of the words in the above example is required to make the logical deduction. Thus, as with the case above, the defining characteristic, essence, is negated. Now as we have seen without an object the law of logic have nothing to work with; and paradoxically this object is negated by logic itself.

A Collaroy to the two arguments above is if the DNA is the essence of a horse and the sub-atomic particles are the essence of the atom what then is the essence of these essences; we end up in an infinite regress. Namely if the essence of the horse is its DNA what is the essence of the DNA perhaps some molecule but the what is the essence of this perhaps some atom but what is the essence of...... etc. Similarly if H2O is the essence of water what is the essence of H2O perhaps H2 + O. But what is the essence of H2 perhaps H + H. But what is the essence of H perhaps one proton + one electron,. But what is the essence of the proton perhaps some combination of.....etc.

Two example from physic and one from philosophy argue that the notion of essence is a myth. Max Born notes that "...the theory of relativity... has never abandoned all attempts to assign properties to matter... But often a measurable quantify is not a property of a thing but a property of its *relation* to other things..." (Marcus, 1991,p.9). Similarly Weizacker notes " the idea of infinite nature existing as such... is the myth of modern science... modern science is forced by its own consistency to realise that it has merely raised another myth.." (ibid, p.155) . Philosophical Quine says much the same thing about the 'myth of physical objects' "... in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods [ of Homer] differ only in kind'. (ibid, .149).

That the laws of logic are not conditions of truth is seen clearly from science, psychology and sociology. In science it is an accepted fact that an object ie an atom is simultaneously a particle and a wave packet. To be sure it is only in interactions that it behaves as one or the other, but the point is that to characterise the object completely the object must be characterised as a combinations of contradictory characteristics. Similarly in psychology every one knows, particularly mothers, that one in some cases has to be paradoxically cruel to be kind. In other words some actions or statements can be simultaneously cruel and kind. Psychological then a persons total character is characterised by its contradictory make up we are a *coincidentia oppositorium* ie psychological androgynes. Sociologically individual s in Western societies can be characterised as being simultaneously free as well as slaves ie the freedom the people have in electing masters who enslave them with legislative laws of social and individual control. Also the Western media is simultaneously a medium of information and misinformation. As Marcuse notes civilisation is characterised by the ".. rational character of it irrationality" (Marcus, 1991, p.9). It is no use saying that, like the scientific object, a social object must be one or the other in a perceptual interaction, the point is that like the scientific object a complete characterisation is one made up of contradictory elements, which violates the law of identity

Now, though the logical illogicality of logic can be demonstrated no logical inference can be drawn from this demonstration logically. We are left in a permanent state of indeterminacy in regard to anything, even the logical truth value this statement, being an inference, is left indeterminate. Illogically we are left with nothing to say. Because logic demonstrates the logical illogicality of everything note I say demonstrates not proves for the notion of poof itself left indeterminate. An analogy of what has happened with the logical demonstration of the illogic of logic is the uroboric snake that eats its own tail in other words logic has dissolved itself away like the medicine which makes you better by making you vomit and thus expunge itself.

Adorno in his 'Negative Dialectic' similarly arrives at the critique of the identity of the object. Negative Dialectics seeks to undermine the ontology of the object by pointing out its lack of an identity. Habermas in his overview of Adorno writes "identify thinking turned against itself becomes pressed into continual self-denial and allows the wounds it inflicts on itself and its objects to be seen...Adorno practices determinate negation unremittingly in the categorical network of Hegelian logic - as a fetishism of demystification" (Habermas, 1995, p.186). But Adorno is locked within the inevitable paradoxes generated by conceptual thinking and logic itself. As Habermas points out "the totalising self-critique of reason gets caught within a performative contradiction..." (ibid, p.183) Adorno uses the metaphysics of presence [ontological identity] contained within language and the principle of logic to negate this metaphysical presence by demonstrating that its is a myth. Thus Adorno turns logic upon itself in demonstrating the myth of identity he demonstrates the myth of the very tools he uses to deconstruct the Adorno should have stopped hear. But instead he jumps into myth of identity. conceptualisation by outlining an alternative, by using the very tools he has invalidated, in 'Negative Dialectics', a metaphysics of the aesthetic in 'Aesthetic Theory'... The self-reverential critique of logic leads to silence not more verbosity.

XL

Hercules washed out the stables of King Auygeias of Elis? from years of accumulated shit what this essay does via its 'critique of reason' and thus epistemology is wash way the centuries of philosophical dross accumulated from the pre-Socratic philosophers to the present. The fashionable 'critiques of reason' from Nietzsche through Adorno to Habermas, Foucault and Deridda are but one more heap of dross on the already mountainous heap. Like the Logical Positivist, Analytical philosophers antifoundationalists, and for that matter all philosophy, they all have accepted that the principles of logic are the basis and arbitrators of the validity of their arguments; in other words they have not then denied the logical basis of their reasoning's and thus cut the ground from under themselves by admitting logics total invalidity. Even those philosophers who deny the validity of perception don't deny the validity of inference in making this denial. Once the indeterminacy of inference is accepted the centuries of accumulated philosophical arguments for or against amount to no more than dross. With the invalidity of logic, reason, thinking, loses its foundation and we arrive at the unintelligible the meaninglessness the absurd. With the indeterminance of reason everything becomes possible and not possible with no way to determine between the two. This amounts to a 'critique of reason' the universe becomes quiet the endless squabbling of humanity like a nagging housewife stops. The critique of reason amounts to the silencing of discourse no sound is uttered the world becomes silent as Wittgenstein roared 'of what I don't know I cannot speak'.



# APPENDIX

# THE GROUNDING OF LOGIC

### PSYCHOLOGICALNECESSITY:PSYCHOLOGISM/APRIORISM

### "ALL DEDUCTIONS ARE MADE A PRIORI."<sup>1</sup>

&

PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIOLOGY:CONVENTIONALISM/CONTEXTUALISM "EXPLAINING RATIONALITY AND EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY BY REFERENCE TO WHAT SOCIETY LETS US SAY, RATHER THAN THE LATTER BY THE FORMER..."2

## PSYCHOLOGICALNECESSITY:PSYCHOLOGISM/APRIORISM

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> L.Wittgenstein 1953, 5.133, p.39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> R.Rorty, 1979, p.174.

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Dancy notes that foundationalist distinguish between inferential and non-inferential justification.<sup>3</sup> As such Dancy asks "what, however justifies the principles of inference on which any inferential justification is made."<sup>4</sup> Russell claimed that what justified them is that they are *a priori*.<sup>5</sup> This chapter will argue we have philosophers, like Descartes, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein who in fact ground inference or logic psychologistically and it is this psychologism that gives the foundation for their a priorism. These philosopher belong to what I call the philosophical psychological, era. With Descartes through Hume, Kant and onto Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus we enter the philosophical psychology era. In this account inference is grounded in the psychological make up of man namely it is seen as being impossible for made to think other than by the principles of logic. Thus 'man becomes the measure of all things' as Protagoras noted. This chapter will argue that in the psychological era inference or the laws of logic are not justified or grounded because they are 'relations of ideas', or 'analytic, or 'tautologies'; they are grounded because logical necessity is an innate apsychologically necessity; the laws of logic or inference are the only way we can think. Thus what we have is that in the psychological era the logical necessity of the laws of logic does not come about because these laws are 'relations of ideas,' 'analytic' or 'tautologies' their logical necessity is due to their apriority and logical necessity being an innate psychological disposition ie 'laws of thought'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> J.Dancy, 1994, p.212. <sup>4</sup> ibid, p.213.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> B.Russell, 1926, p.226

Though Hume spoke of 'matters of fact' and 'relations of ideas; Kant spoke of 'analytic truths' and synthetic truths' and Wittgenstein, of the <u>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</u>, spoke of 'states of affairs' and 'tautologies' If one where to argue that inference or logic was grounded in terms of say Hume's 'relations of ideas' or Kant's 'analytic truths', or Wittgenstein's 'tautologies', this line of argument would in fact misrepresent how these philosophers in fact ground inference or logic. In the case of Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein inference is grounded in psychological necessity. Their dichotomies themselves are based upon the prior grounding of inference as being logically necessary psychologically.

#### PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY

Aristotle thought "...that there is something of the divine in us to the extent that we reason." <sup>6</sup> Throughout the middle ages though the demarcation of science and religion was becoming greater " human reason is still in the image of God."<sup>7</sup> Things take a different turn when Nicolaus Cusanus brings back the idea of Protagoras. that 'man is the measure of all things' when he argues that man " under definitive renunciation of all to seek the foundation of truth in other areas outside of the *mens* [human mind] itself, and to decide for himself alone and determine what certainty, knowledge and truth mean."<sup>8</sup>

#### DESCARTES

Descartes begins the modern self examination of reason and ushers in the philosophical psychological era . Descartes seems to be caught between the old world and the modern

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Hamlym , 1987, p.70.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Horster, 1992, p.45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> ibid, p.45-46)

which he ushered in. In one degree Descartes seems to agree with Protagoras that man is the fount of truth or 'the measure of all things' and the old idea that God plays a part. Descartes argues that certainty is guaranteed by the natural 'light of reason' the 'clear and distinct perception'. This 'natural light' of reason guaranteed the indubitability of the propositions of logic and mathematics in this regard "man is the measure of all things. For Descartes the propositions of logic where innate *aprior*i - universal, necessary and totally independent of experience- in this regard Descartes is seen as being a rationalist.

In the '<u>Meditation</u>s' Descartes' uses two separate epistemology's: one psychological (a necessary and sufficient condition for truth) and the other metaphysical. Though the metaphysical flows out of the psychological, as a deduction, it does not guarantee, or validate the psychological; whereas the psychological does guarantee, or validate the metaphysical. In the '<u>Meditation</u>s' reason is used to demonstrate the truths of God's existence; but these truths are derived, not from reason, but from the self-validating extrasensory source - intuition. This intuitive source is quite other than discursive reasoning, and is the psychological foundation or axiom from which all the philosophical arguments follow.

For Descartes the laws of mathematics are innate ideas of the mind<sup>9</sup>. But the laws of logic are not innate ideas but are the very fabric of the mind which process the innate ideas Descartes can doubt everything even the truths of mathematics<sup>10</sup>, but the one thing he

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Cottingham, 1989, p.144.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Descartes, 1987, p.14-15.

cannot doubt is that he is thinking<sup>11</sup>. Thinking for Descartes is the mind using the laws of logic. For even though God could have made it such that the truths of mathematics are false one thing he could not have done was make a contradiction true:. As Descartes states "...he [God] will never bring it about that... two and three added together are more than five or any thing of the kind in which I see a manifest contradiction."<sup>12</sup> So he we see that the laws of logic are not so much as innate ideas of the mind but are instead the very innate workings of the mind. This idea as we shall see is repeated in Hume and Kant.

So what ground the laws of logic. We have two alternative ways. One psychological and the other ontological. We can say that the laws of logic are grounded because we cannot think any other way [this is what Hume and Kant argue] or we can say they are grounded because logic mirrors reality ie logical ontology. It is the former alternative which Descartes argue for.

. At the beginning of the 'Third Meditation' Descartes argues that he is psychologically "certain that I am a thinking thing [ the *Cogito*]"<sup>13</sup> because "...in this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear and distinct perception."<sup>14</sup> In other words the clear and distinct perception guarantees the 'Cogito'. Now Descartes notes that "...this would not be enough to make me certain of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out that

<sup>13</sup>ibid,t, p.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> ibid, p.17, 22,25. <sup>12</sup> ibid, p.25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> ibid. p.24

something which I perceived with such clarity and distinctiveness was false."<sup>15</sup> To alleviate this doubt Descartes formulates, without proof, the general rule, namely "...I now seem to be able to lay down as a general rule that whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is true."<sup>16</sup> Thus it could be assumed that the clear and distinct perception guarantees the '*Cogito*' while the truth of the clear and distinct perception is guaranteed by the general rule which itself is not guaranteed by the clear and distinct perception. If this is Descartes' intention then there is no 'circularity of intuition'; but this is not Descartes intention. Descartes' intention is clearly seen in the 'Fifth Meditation' where we see that in formulating the general rule Descartes left out a step. In the 'Fifth Meditation' Descartes states that "... I have amply demonstrated that everything of which I am clearly aware is true. And even if I had not demonstrated this, the nature of my mind is such that I cannot but assent to these things, at least so long as I clearly perceive *them.*<sup>17</sup> Thus we can see the step left out, namely the italicised above, gives support for the general rule because it is psychologically impossible not to realise the truth of a clear and distinct perception. In this regard Cottingham points out view of Frankfurt that"... Descartes is recording his subjective conviction of truth... not claiming that he has any guarantee of its actual truth."<sup>18</sup>Consequently we can see that the clear and distinct perception is self-validating because its truths are guaranteed only by itself, because of the nature of the mind. In this regard H. Frankfurt notes<sup>19</sup> "...[Descartes] himself

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> ibid, p.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> ibid, p.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> ibid, p.45

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Cottingham, op.cit, p.69.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> H. Frankfurt (1978), 'Descartes on the Consistency of Reason'. in M. Hooker (ed) <u>Descartes: Critical and</u> <u>Interpretative Essays</u>, John Hopkins University Press, p.26

acknowledges [that the clear and distinct perceptions] are justified by nothing other than clear and distinct perception itself."

Kenny likewise agrees. when he states "...Descartes does not offer the veracity of God as ground for accepting the truth of intuition. It is because even the veracity of God will not suffice to show that the intuition may not be, absolutely speaking, false, but because the simple intuition by itself provides both psychologically and logically the best grounds for accepting its truth"<sup>20</sup>.

The logical truths of reality are not guaranteed by the mind but by God. Gewirth states, on this point that " [for] Descartes' ... it is by the psychological certainty of clear and distinct perceptions that God's existence is proved, what God guarantees is the metaphysical certainty of such perceptions."<sup>21</sup> Now though the laws of logic of the mind are immutable the laws of logic of reality could have been other wise and are thus not necessary but contingent. In the sixth reply Descartes argues that all truth including those of logic could have been otherwise<sup>22</sup>. In this regard what we take to be necessary truths may only have been made to be contingent by God. Also if God could have made the truths otherwise then necessary truths are not necessary but only contingent. Like wise Descartes notes that "even is God has willed that some truths should be necessary, this does not mean that he willed them necessarily, for it is one thing to will that they be necessary, and quite another to will them necessarily"<sup>23</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> A. Kenny, 1968, p.194 <sup>21</sup> A. Gewirth 1941, p. 386

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> R. Descartes op.cit, p.93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Hacking. I (1980) p.54.

Thus we see that because God made man the forms of thought, or laws of thought ie logic are also his creation. God also made it so that the laws of logic also apply to reality. Nevertheless there it is not necessary that the laws of thought agree with the laws of reality. This is because it is possible the laws of logic regarding reality may change but the laws of logic of our mind are fixed. In other words the forms of thought are *a priori* in the true sense of being independent of experience, because they not necessarily true in regard to the ontological nature of experience. That the psychological forms of thought correspond to the logical ontology of reality is only because God has willed it. It could be otherwise. The View that the metaphysical truths of logic and mathematic are not ontologically necessary, as distinct from their psychological necessity, would be, as we shall see, another to the logical ontology of Kant. In this regard Mills arguing ,as we shall see against Kant, that the truths of logic and mathematics are not necessary and as a consequence could possibly change fits in with Descartes metaphysical views. The view that laws of thought are necessary psychologically fit with the views of Hume, the early Wittgenstein, Ayer, and in some degree Putnam. Thus for Descartes though inference ie logic is an epistemic condition for truth, inference or logic is grounded psychologically not ontologically.

#### HUME

Where Descartes tries to find certainty and alleviate doubt Hume embraces uncertainty. This uncertainty or scepticism though is only in regard to matters of fact, or knowledge of reality, it is not in regard the relations of ideas in other words to logic or deductive inference. In outlining Hume's arguments it is important to realise that he uses the term reason in two senses. In one sense it refers to the employment of what we shall see are the three principles of the imagination. It is reason in this sense that allows Hume to argue for scepticism in regard to matters of fact, or knowledge of reality. In the other sense reason refers to the use of logical principles. It is these logical principles that become the epistemic conditions for the certainty of the relations of ideas ie mathematics and the ground upon which Hume constructs his naturalistic account of reason in the first sense.

In regard to reason in the first sense Hume believes, like Kant<sup>24</sup>, that reasoning ends in its own destruction<sup>25</sup> with the result that all the products of reason and sense experience lead to the consequence that all is uncertain.<sup>26</sup> ie he is a sceptic.. In the conclusion to <u>Book One</u>, Hume acknowledges that he is a sceptic. A sceptic according to Hume is one "who hold all is uncertain and that our judgement is not in any thing possest of *any* measures of truth and falsehood."<sup>27</sup> Hume acknowledges that reason in this sense leads to paradox. As he notes reason leads to the conclusion that as a general maxim "...no refin'd or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received By this means you cut off entirely all science and philosophy...[but] you expressly contradict yourself; since this maxim must be built on the preceding reasoning, which will be allow'd to be sufficiently refin'd and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> O, O'Neill (1994) in 'Vindication of Reason' in P. Guyer (ed) <u>The Cambridge Companion to Kant</u>, Cambridge University Press, ,p.188 notes that "...Kants initial diagnosis is that human reason leads to catastrophe [ because it ends in darkness and contradiction]." O'Neill goes onto state (ibid, p.303 "...Kant [might] just as well have conceded quite explicitly that he was undertaking neither critique nor vindication of reason and recognised that he is a skeptic."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> D. Hume 1987, pp.227-228

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> ibid, pp. 231-268

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> ibid, p. 234

metaphysical."<sup>28</sup> Hume in acknowledging the truth of scepticism makes the observation that regardless of the inevitable extinguishing of belief in anything human beings still continue to believe. The epistemic condition<sup>29</sup> Hume accepts as giving access to truth is not empiricism but rationality or the laws of logic. These laws of logic may make Hume's 'relations of ideas' necessary truths, but what makes these laws of logic necessary is their psychological nature.

Throughout Hume's account of scepticism is the presupposition that reason in the second sense can be a firm foundation for knowledge. Hume argues that "in all demonstrative sciences the rules are a certain and infallible...our reason must be consider'd as a kind of cause of which truth is the natural effect."<sup>30</sup> To accept this conclusion Hume must believe that reason in the second sense is a valid epistemic condition. Hume argues that "the sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty and the nature of our ideas..."<sup>31</sup> Though Hume does not say so in an explicit manner he does to my mind make a clear distinction in this passage between thinking, or reason and the rational process of logic. Using logic Hume arrives at the idea that there are no innate ideas there are innate disposition which *process* the ideas. Once these

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> ibid, p.315

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>It could be maintained that Hume's naturalism anchors epistemology in human nature In the naturalistic fact that, as will be shown, the mind projects upon material realty it's characteristics Now Hume's scepticism does not enable him to be certain about anything. This uncertainty comes from him believing in the ability of reason to demonstrate truth. In this regard reason becomes the foundational epistemology. Though Hume's naturalism accounts for this belief Hume's scepticism makes this claim it self uncertain due to reason. As can be seen Hume's argument become circular in that naturalism accounts for scepticism which undermines naturalism which accounts for this undermining *ad in finitum*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> ibid, p. 231

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> ibid, p.43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> ibid, pp.49-55.

ideas are produced by the mind then they are acted on by reason. As Hume notes "...the mind has produced an individual idea, upon which we reason,..."<sup>33</sup> Logic leads Hume to argue that the ideas are manipulated by the memory and imagination<sup>34</sup> and that the imagination is guided by three universal principles or relations between ideas ie resemblance, contiguity in time and space and cause effect.<sup>35</sup> The 'understanding' is the activation of these three universal principle.<sup>36</sup> Hume's scepticism come from the fact that the logical inference drawn from the make up of the workings of the understanding via resemblance contiguity and cause and effect is that we cannot know anything because these workings of the imagination leads to contradictions.<sup>37</sup> It is not that logic negates itself it is that logic negate the reality constructed via the imagination because this construction leads to contradictions. In this regard Hume is implying that the structure of reality obeys logical laws, because the structure of reality cannot be contradictory. Hume states this clearly when he argues "if this therefore be absurd in fact and reality [logical ontology], it must also be absurd in ideas since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea [psychologically] is absurd and impossible."<sup>38</sup>In other words Hume is advocating a logical ontology as well arguing that it is psychologically absurd to have

absurd clear and distinct ideas.

Now where Descartes distinguishes between logical ontology and psychological logical necessity Hume likewise to seems to make this distinction. For Hume reality follows

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> ibid, p.68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> ibid, p.56

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> ibid, p.58.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> ibid, p.315.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> ibid, pp.313-314.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> ibid, p.67.

logical principles, as we have seen, and the human mind is disposed for psychological logical necessity, as we shall see, but where Descartes argued that the logical ontology was not by necessity dependent upon the psychological logical necessity, for Hume, from the passage above, they both necessitate each other. In other words because the world is logical we must think logically and because we think logically the world must be logical.

In regard to the 'relations of ideas' Hume argues that there are four philosophical relations which depend solely upon ideas and in which "all certainty arises from the comparison of ideas, and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable, so long as the ideas continue the same."<sup>39</sup> Now just like the three universal principles these relations "...are connected together in the imagination..."<sup>40</sup> These relations are: resemblance; proportions in quality and number; degrees of any quality; and contraiety. These of relation of ideas "...fall more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration...[and come about] without any inquiry or reasoning."<sup>41</sup> These relations though depending upon ideas are prior to ideas and thus experience and are thus *apriori*. Hume say this when he states "when any objects resemble each other, the resemblance will first strike the eye, or the mind, and seldom requires a second examination. The same is for *contraiety* and with the degree of any quality... we might proceed after the same manner in fixing the proportions of quantity or number..."<sup>42</sup> In other words these relations being intuitive we just know. Now the relations between these philosophical

<sup>41</sup> ibid, p.118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> ibid, p.126

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> ibid, p.61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> ibid, p.118.

relations are logical relations. This is seen in Hume's account of algebra and arithmetic where he states "... we carry on a chain of reasoning's to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect exactness and certainty. We are possest of a precise standard by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers; and accordingly as they correspond or not to that standard we determine their relations without any possibility of error."<sup>43</sup> In talking about having no possibility of error Hume is infact advocating logical necessity. Now it is hear that the ground for the necessity of the 'relations of ideas' and thus logical necessity is seen to be psychological. In regard to logical necessity Stroud makes the point that for Hume logical necessity is not due to logical ontology but instead psychological necessity because Hume argues that we cannot conceive of it otherwise. Hume argues that "..the necessity, which makes two times two equal four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in an act of the understanding, by which we consider and compare these ideas..."<sup>44</sup> In regard to this quote Stroud argues that according to Hume "... if we try to conceive of the product two and two not being four we fail."<sup>45</sup> Stroud notes that what Hume would have us believe is "...our having the idea of 'absolute' necessity is...the result of our trying, and failing, to perform a particular act."46

#### **HUME: COMMENT**

What I will do hear is show how Hume's arguments that logical necessity is due to our psychological nature comes about psychologically.. Hume argues that "...the necessity of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> ibid, p.119.
<sup>44</sup> D.Hume 1938,p.166

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Stroud, 1994, p.243.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> ibid, p.244.

power which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other"<sup>47</sup> Stroud notes that the necessity of cause and effect can be explained according to Hume idea of projection.<sup>48</sup> Here Stroud argues that "...the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from one to the other..."<sup>49</sup> On this point Stroud notes that Hume' arguments lead to the consequence that " in drawing the analogy with the idea of casual necessity Hume would be saying that the idea of 'absolute' or 'logical' necessity is also a 'fiction' we inevitably 'project' onto what we think about only because something happens in our minds on certain occasions."<sup>50</sup> In this regard if we follow through Hume's arguments then though logical necessity like casual necessity is due to our psychological nature.

Consequently as there is no casual necessity in the world there is also no logical necessity.

Thus we see that for, as for Descartes, the principles of logic are *apriori* Like Descartes Hume believes these principle are psychologically necessary because we cannot think any other way. Hume, like Descartes argued that reality does obey these principles, but where Descartes agues it is not necessary that reality does obeys these logical principles Hume does not state his position. Now as we shall see Kant, like both Hume and Descartes, argues for the apriority of logic, a logical ontology and the psychological necessity of the principles of logic or inference.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> D.Hume op.cit, p.166.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> B.Stroud, op.cit, p.240.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> ibid, p.241.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> ibid, p.241.

### KANT

Kant begins his <u>Critique of Pure Reason<sup>51</sup></u> in the same manner as Hume began his<u>A</u> <u>Treatise of Human Nature</u>. Where Hume points out it is by logic that he is going to investigate the faculty of reason Kant states the same method. Kant states that " the sphere of logic is quite precisely delimited; its sole concern is to give an exhaustive exposition and strict proof of the formal rules of all thought, whether it be *a priori* or empirical..." <sup>52</sup> Thus the whole edifice of the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> is constructed via the principles logic. In this regard logic becomes the epistemic condition for Kant's argument, for as we shall see logic is a precondition for thought and the principles of logic are necessary because we can not think in any other way - just as Descartes and Hume argued.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> After Hume's sceptical arguments the problem for philosophy, as Kemp-Smith argues Kant realised was that "...the principle of causality is neither self-evident nor capable of logical demonstration, and [Kant] at once realised that what is true of this principle must also hold of all the other principles fundamental to science and philosophy. Kant further agreed that inductive inference from the data of experience is only possible upon the prior acceptance of rational principles independently established; and that we may not look to experience for proof of their validity." (N.Kemp Smith, <u>A Commentary To Kant's Critique of Pure Reason</u>. Macmillian, 1979, p.xxv11Kant attempted to reconcile these problems of empiricism and rationalism by driving a wedge between them. This is captured succinctly in the introduction to the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> where Kant states " there can be no doubt that all knowledge begins with experience...But though all our knowledge begins with experience it does not follow that it all arises out of experience" (Kant,1993,, B.1, p..41-42.) Kant's attempt at reconciliation has been call his 'Copernican revolution' by which is meant not an anthropocentric philosophy but a view that sees reality not as something determining man's views, as Hume thought, but reality itself as an appearance generated by man himself.<sup>51</sup> In attempting this revolution Kant uses, as we shall see, a great deal of empiricist and rationalistic epistemological apparatus of his day ie representations and 'innate ideas' (*apriori* categories)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Kant, 1993, B.1x, p.18.

Kant maintains that thinking relies upon logic<sup>53</sup>. Logic can be divided into the general and the logic of the special employment of the understanding [ie that of the individual sciences].<sup>54</sup> The former Kant argues "...contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought."<sup>55</sup> General logic is further divided into pure and applied<sup>56</sup>. Now Kant notes that "[p]ure general logic has to do, therefore, only with principles *a priori*, and is *a canon of the understanding* and reason..."<sup>57</sup> Now general logic is according to Kant devoid of any cultural influences. As he states " In [general logic] we abstract from all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised, ie from the influence of the senses, the play of imagination the laws of memory, the force of habit, inclination, etc., and so from all sources of prejudice, indeed from all causes from which this or that knowledge may arise or seem to arise."<sup>58</sup>

Thinking for Kant is that process which brings about a unity of the manifold or disparate representations supplied to intuition; it is a logical function. As Kant argues "Thought [thinking], taken by itself, is merely the logical function, and therefore the pure spontaneity of the combination of the manifold of a merely possible intuition."<sup>59</sup> Thinking for Kant as we have seen is a faculty of the understanding and according to Kant "[t]hought is knowledge by means of concepts [categories]."<sup>60</sup> In other words the content of thinking or what thinking uses in its formal function is categories. These

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> ibid, A.51, p.93

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> ibid, A.52, p.93

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> ibid, A.52, p.93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> ibid, A.53, p.94

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> ibid, A.53, p.94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> ibid, A.53, p.94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> ibidt, B.428, p.381.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> ibid, B.94, p.106

categories likewise are mere "...forms of thought..."<sup>61</sup> Now the process of thinking is logical as we have seen ie logic supplies the "...necessary rules of thought"<sup>62</sup>.. What this means is that the concepts or categories are structured by means of the laws of logic: and these laws are, for Kant, the Aristotelian laws of logic.<sup>63</sup> Thinking, for Kant, works in conjunction with intuition. They are intimately tied together in the epistemological subject, the "I think",'s constitution of the world. Kant maintains that " [o]ur nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible...The faculty on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of intuition is the understanding. To neither of theses powers may preference be given over the other. Without sensibility no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."<sup>64</sup> Thus we see that the categories ,though used in thinking, are themselves independent of an individuals thinking. They exist in fixed immutable form and thought is rigdified into a fixed Aristotelian logical form dependent upon the objective and independent categories to give it substance. In this regard we can see that thinking is a infrastructure and the categories the superstructural content for thinking. Thus we see that the mind imposes structure upon reality via the *a priori* principles of logic ie forms of thought operating upon the *a priori* categories. It is the principles of logic which gives order to the world of appearances. Kant argues that the rules which the mind imposes upon the world are contained within the mind itself. Kant states "... the understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as being a priori. They find expression in *a priori* concepts, to which all objects

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> ibid, B.150, p.164.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> ibid, A.52, p.93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> ibid, B.v111, p.17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> ibid, A.51, p.93

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of experience necessarily conform and which they must agree... we can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves put into them.<sup>65</sup><sup>65</sup>. This idealism<sup>67</sup> argues that it is not that the mind conforms to objects in the world but that objects conform to the nature of the mind. As Kant states "If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know any thing of the latter *a priori*; but if the object (as the object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility.<sup>68</sup> Now logic for Kant is one of these *a priori* epistemic conditions to which the world of appearance conforms.

That the laws of logic are by necessity true is a psychological fact for Kant rather than due to any logical ontology about the world of appearance; since as we have seen the world of appearances must conform to the operations of the mind as is agued in Kant's transcendental idealism. Thought would not be thought unless it conforms to logic. This is seen in Kant's account of the law of contradiction. R.C.Walker quotes Kant as saying "[i]f I now reflect for a moment as to why that which contradicts itself should be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> ibidt, B.xv111, p.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> According to Kant perceiving and thinking are different. In perceiving apprehension of particulars is due to the faculty of sense . This apprehension is what Kant calls intuition. To the understanding belongs the apprehension of concepts and the rule by which they are applied. The synthetic *a priori* judgements come from the understanding. Concepts are of three types: *a posteriori* ie those concepts abstracted from experience; *a priori* ie those concepts which are not abstracted from experience; and Ideas those concepts which are not abstracted from experience. The faculty of employing Ideas is Reason. Kant argues that mathematics is made up of synthetic *a priori* knowledge just as science and everyday common sense knowledge is also. The concepts which Kant argues are applicable to sense perception is what he calls the categories and synthetic *a priori* judgements make use of these categories. The categories are not abstracted from reality but are imposed by the mind upon reality. In other words it is the mind which orders and structures, through the categories reality ie "transcendental idealism". Kant distinguishes between the pure self and the empirical self. It is the pure self not the empirical self which impose upon reality the categories. (S.Korner, 'Kant' in J.O.Urmson & J. Ree (ed), <u>The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers</u>, Routledge, 1992, pp.157-160.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> As was said above Strawson feels that this transcendental idealism of Kant's is incoherent. See note. 6, On the other hand Allison argues that that there are "...serious doubts about the adequacy of this interpretation" (H. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Yale University Press, 1983, p.6) <sup>68</sup> Kant, op.cit, p.22

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altogether nothing and impossible, I notice that through it the Principle of Contradiction, the last logical ground of everything, is destroyed, and that therefore all possibility vanishes, and nothing remains over to be thought."<sup>69</sup> Korner points out that if it where not for the *a prioris*, which includes logic, we would be deprived of the possibly of consistent thought "more bluntly, we just could not think."<sup>70</sup> Logic is thus the form of coherent thought not the ontology of a world independent of thought. Descartes thought that God could have created a world that violated the laws of logic would be absurd for Kant; as Kant would say that any world of appearance would have to conform to the structures of the mind. For Kant thought and the structure of the world of appearance presupposes the principles of logic; because logic is for Kant prior to all thinking activity. Now it is important to realise that logic being an *a priori* truth is prior to and different from analytic truths<sup>71</sup> The necessity of logic truths is due to there psychological nature and is different to the necessity of analytic truths.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> R.C.Walker 1978t, p.23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> S. Korner, 1990, P.25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Kant's classification involves the ideas of : *a priori*; *a posteriori*; analytic and synthetic judgments. By *a priori and a posteriori* Kant's means "...any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and even all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is called *a priori*, and is distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources *a posteriori*, that is, in experience." (E.Kant, 'Critique of Pure Reason', in N.Kemp-Smith (translation) Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 1993, p.42, B 2) Coupled with this independence of experience Kant also states that "[n]ecessity and strict universality are thus safe criteria of a priori knowledge and inseparable from one another ...it is advisable to use the two criteria separately, each by itself being infallible.."(ibis, p.44, B 4) Similarly Kant means by analytic and synthetic "...all judgements in which the relation of subject to predicate is thought (I take into consideration affirmative judgements only, the subsequent application to negative judgements being easily made), this relation is possible in to different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is ( covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgement analytic, in the other synthetic." (ibid, p.48, B 11)

Now Korner notes that though " all analytic judgements must be apriori"<sup>72</sup> Kant makes a distinction between *a priori* judgements and analytic ones. Kant believed that "...the necessity which is in all a priori judgements... is not the logical necessity of analytic ones"<sup>73</sup> Now what makes all a *prior* truths necessary is their function as the foundation of all thinking<sup>74</sup>. Where it is possible to deny the truths of synthetic<sup>75</sup> *a priori* propositions without contradiction the denial of a prioris is make impossible any thought about the world, because as Korner notes this "...would deprive us of the possibility of consistent thought. More bluntly, we just could not think."<sup>76</sup>

Thus we see that for Descartes, Hume and Kant the principles of logic are *apriori* and that they are necessarily true is a psychological fact due to the nature of the human mind. Where Hume and Descartes argues that the world is structured by the laws of logic independent of the mind, in other words the world is logical independent of the perceiving mind, because in the case of Descartes God made it so. Kant disagrees because he argues that logic is not a description of the world independent of the perceiving mind because the logical ontology of the world is only due to the mind. Where Descartes argues that God could have made the world to violate the laws of logic, even though the human mind operates logically, Kant would regard this as absurd. For as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Korner op.cit, p.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> ibid, p.24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> ibid, p.25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Kemp-Smith notes that for Kant while necessity is a criterion of the *a priori* "...the empirical [is] synonymous with the contingent [ non-necessary]." (N.Kemp-Smith op.cit, p.56) Similarly Kemp-Smith points out that where the analytic judgements are *a priori* and based upon the law of contradiction (ibid, p.59) for their validity synthetic judgements are dependent upon experience for the truth of their judgements (ibid, p.39)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> S.Korner op.cit, p.25

Putnam points out for "Kant logical laws hold not only in 'the actual world' but in all other 'possible worlds' as well."<sup>77</sup> This idea of Kants is reminiscent of Leibniz's argument that "...the truths of reason [are] true in all possible worlds."<sup>78</sup> Thus that logic hold in 'all possible worlds' for Kant is because the forms of logical coherent thought make it so; we cannot think other than logically and thus because we structure the world of appearances the world of appearances must obey our logical principles.

### WITTGENSTEIN<sup>79</sup>

The views of Wittgenstein of the <u>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</u> regarding the grounding of logic are somewhat identical with the views of Kant. Wittgenstein, like Kant, grounds logical necessity psychologically, and he, like Kant, regards logic as being an *a priori*, Where Kant and Wittgenstein differ is in regard to the logical ontology of the world. Where Kant see the world of appearance as being only logical because we make it so, Wittgenstein see the world as logical in its own right, independent of mans logical constructions. Even though Wittgenstein argues that we are unable to think illogically the worlds logical ontology is nevertheless independent of this thinking.

In the <u>Philosophical Investigations</u> Wittgenstein argues that the aim of philosophy is "...to shew the fly the way out of the bottle."<sup>80</sup> In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Putnam, 1995, p.247.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> W.Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in W.Quines <u>From a Logical Point of View</u>, Harvard University Press, 1971, p.20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> In the literature Wittgenstein is referred to by Dummett and Putnam as a radical conventionalist. This characterisation to my mind is a play on words How Putnam (1985, p.127) defines 'radical conventionalist ie "which holds that the truth of the theorems as well as that of the axioms arises from us" could also be labelled upon Descartes, Hume and Kant when they speak of the laws of logic as being necessary psychologically because they are the only way we can think in other words the laws arise from us.. See chapter three. To my mind Dummett's and Putnam's definition of 'radical conventionalism' substatiates my arguments I have argued above that Wittgenstein is arguing a form of *a prioism*.

Wittgenstein argues that "the limits of my language means the limits of my world."<sup>81</sup> Now the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the fly in the bottle where the limits of Wittgensteins world is logic. Wittgenstein infact says this when he states "logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits."<sup>82</sup> Now in this world pervaded by logic Wittgenstein argues that "...the only necessity is logical necessity."<sup>83</sup> and "just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility."<sup>84</sup> Now the cause of this logical necessity is, as for Kant, Hume and Descartes, the psychological nature of man ie the inner necessity of us being only able to think logically. That logic is an inner or psychological necessity Wittgenstein states clearly when he argues in regard to causality "...we could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference...<sup>85</sup> This psychological necessity to think logically has the consequence that, as Wittgenstein argues, "...the truth is that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look like.<sup>86</sup> and again "thought can never be of anything illogical, since if it were, we should have to think illogically."<sup>87</sup> These thoughts of Wittgenstein are very much like the views of Kant. Now it is this inability to think illogically that makes logic for Wittgenstein an *a priori*, just like for Descartes, Hume and Kant. As Wittgenstein argues "...what makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought."<sup>88</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> L.Wittgenstein, 1953, 309, p.103.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> L.Wittgenstein, 1976, 5.6, p.56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> ibid, 5.61, p.56

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> ibid, 6.37, p.70.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> ibid, 6.375, p.71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> ibid, 5.1362, p.39

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> ibid,3.031, p.11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> ibid, 3.03, p.11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> ibid, 5.4731, p.47.

Finch notes that all regard the <u>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</u> as beings about "what is the essential nature of the world presupposed by a purely logical language"<sup>89</sup> Now what the world and language have in common that makes language able to mirror the world is logical form. Wittgenstein states this when he argues "propositions show the logical form of reality."<sup>90</sup> and again " propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to represent it - logical form."<sup>91</sup> Thus the world is logical independent of language, but is nevertheless the logical equivalent of language.

Now there is no better way to summarise all of the above than to let Wittgenstein do it. Wittgenstein in the <u>Philosophical Investigations</u> in fact succinctly captures all of the above when he elaborates upon No.5.5563 of the <u>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</u> as "thought is surrounded by a halo - Its essence, logic, presents an order in fact the apriori order of the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which must be common to both the world and thought",<sup>92</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

Thus we see that what characterises the philosophical psychological period from Descartes, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein is the idea that logic is an *a priori* and that logical necessity is due to psychological necessity. In this regard these philosophers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> H.L.Finch, 1995, p.18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Wittgenstein op.cit, 4.121, p.26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> ibid, 4.12, p.26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> L.Wittgenstein op.cit, 97, p.44..

highlight Russell's claim that if logic is to be grounded it must be grounded because it is an *a priori*. I offered logical criticisms of these philosophers views but agured that these criticisms dont affect the claim that logical necessity is due to our innate psychological nature. Criticism of this claim will be left untill chapter five. Aso I have left criticisms of the notions of the *a priori* and the analytic/ synthetic distinction untill chapter four.

Now the situation changes in the twentieth century with what is turned its 'linguistic turn' As we shall see in chapter three philosopher in their criticisms of the notion of the *a priori* and analytic truths argued for what is termed conventionalism. This period of conventionalism, which I call philosophical sociological, argue that what grounds logic is that it is stipulated by humans to be necessary. In other words the principles of logic are logically necessary not because they are based on psychological necessity, and them being *a priori* or analytic, but because humans stipulate that they are to be logically necessary or analytic.

# PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIOLOGY: CONVENTIONALISM/CONTEXTUALISM

#### INTRODUCTION

In this appendixI will argue that the situation changes. In what I call the philosophical sociological the logical necessity of the laws of logic are seen to be due to these laws being seen as rather than a priori but as anayltic. It is treating these laws as analytic that the notions that the laws of logic are true only by convention and as such are the notion that the principles of logic are revisable comes about. This appendix argues that after the Wittgenstein we enter the philosophical sociology era. This era is represented by Carnap, the logical positivist's, such as Ayer and the anti-foundationlist Rorty. Carnap and Ayer undermine the notion of *a priori* justification and argue that the justification of inference is based upon convention ie humans stipulate it to be so. In this stage society takes the central place of man in that inference is no longer seen as being grounded in psychology as it is seen as being grounded by the conventions of society. In this era the logical necessity of the laws of logic are seen to be due to these laws being seen as rather than a priori but as anayltic. It is treating these laws as analytic that the notions that the laws of logic are true only by convention and as such are revisable comes about.

#### WITTGENSTEIN

Now it is important to note that there is disagreement in regard to whether Wittgenstein is a conventionalist or an anti-conventionalist. Putnam notes that Wittgenstein argued in one place that the theorems of mathematics are true by convention because they are based upon a 'rule of description'<sup>93</sup> In another place Putnam points out that Wittgenstein argues against truth by convention because "...it takes logic to derive the consequences from convention."94 Now Putnam makes the important point that "just what Wittgenstein's contention is, in connection with philosophers' opinions, theories, and arguments on the topic of mathematical necessity, has been a subject of considerable controversy." <sup>95</sup> M.Dummett calls Wittgenstein a 'radical conventionalist' because "...the theorems of mathematics and logic ...are not just consequences of conventions but individually conventional."<sup>96</sup> B. Stroud on the other argues that this characterisation cannot stand. because "...Wittgenstein's position was that it is not convention, or legislation but our forms of life (ie our human nature as determined by our biology-plus-cultural-history)..." <sup>97</sup> Now Putnam points out that Stroud's view is "...generally accepted by Wittgenstein scholars."98 Nevertheless Putnam argues that "...if either Dummett or Stroud is right, then Wittgenstein is claiming that mathematical truth and necessity arise in, that it is human nature and forms of life that explain mathematical truth and necessity."99 Consequently Putnam argues, following Dummett, that "...Wittgenstein departed from moderate conventionalism in the direction of radical conventionalism (which holds that the truth of the theorems as well as that of the axioms

<sup>98</sup> ibid, p.117.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> H.Putnam, 1985, p.117

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> ibid, p.116

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> ibid, p.115.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> ibid, p.116.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> ibid, p.117.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> ibid, p.117.

arises from us.,...<sup>100</sup> This characterisation to my mind is a play on words. How Putnam defines 'radical conventionalist ie one that "... holds that the truth of the theorems as well as that of the axioms arises from us" could also be labelled upon Descartes, Hume, Kant and the Wittgenstein, as outlined above, when they speak of the laws of logic as being necessary psychologically; because they are the only way we can think, in other words the laws arise from us.

#### CONVENTIONALISM

From the 1890s on Putnam points out that philosophers as diverse as the pragmatist Peirce, the positivist Mach, the phenomenologist Husserl and the realist Meinong felt that it was by understanding language that could then give an account of logical and mathematical truth.<sup>101</sup> Putnam notes that "for empiricism this 'linguistic turn' meant a shift from psychologism to conventionalism."<sup>102</sup> Now two representatives of this 'linguistic turn' who espoused conventionalism ie logical truths are truths because humans stipulate that they are so, are Carnap and Ayer. For both these philosophers conventionalism is based upon the notion of analytic truths. For Carnap the truths of mathematics where guaranteed by linguistic convention - it is by stipulation that they are analytic<sup>103</sup>. As Quine argued, according to Putnam, "Carnap wanted a notion of analyticity that would have epistemological clout." Ayer wanted to show that *a priori* truths where analytic and as such said nothing about the world because they where in fact tautologies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> ibid, p.127.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> ibid, p.171.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> ibid, p.171.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> H.Putnam, 1995, p.258.
## AYER

Aver in his Language Truth and Logic sought to, like Quine (see chapter four), undermine the notion of the *a priori* such that he "...destroyed the foundations of rationalism<sup>"104</sup> (see Quine chapter four). Aver attempted to do this by equating the a*priori* with analytic truth.<sup>105</sup> Ayer, unlike Quine (see chapter four), accepts the Kantian distinction of analytic and synthetic truths; as he states "I think that we can preserve the logical import of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions while avoiding the confusions which mar his actual account of it..."<sup>106</sup> Aver avoids this confusion by defining an analytic truth one when a proposition "...when its validity depends solely on the definitions it contains..."<sup>107</sup> Ayer argues that not seeing "... the analytic character of the truths of formal logic ...[and] speaking always of judgements instead of propositions...traditional logic gave the impression of being concerned in some specially intimate way with the workings of thought."<sup>108</sup> In this regard Ayer is taking the grounding of logic out of the mind, where it was for Descartes, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein, and placing it in language. Ayer argues that the principles or laws of thought are psychologically not necessary because they are arbitrary; as he states "[the] arbitrarily selected Aristotelian 'laws of thought'.'109

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> A.J.Ayer, 1990, p.66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> ibid, p.80.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> ibid, p.73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> ibid, p.73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> ibid, p.75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> ibid, p.76.

Ayer argues that "...the validity of an analytic proposition is independent of the nature of the external world, so is it independent of the nature of our minds."<sup>110</sup> In this regard Ayer is saying that there is not any necessary logical ontology corresponding to our logical necessity and this logical necessity is not due to the nature of our minds. Ayer in fact argues that logical necessity is due to convention. As Ayer argues "it is perfectly conceivable that we should have employed different linguistic conventions from those we actually do employ. But whatever these conventions might be, the tautologies in which we record them would always be necessary. For any denial would be self-stultifying."<sup>111</sup>

## **AYER: CRITICISM**

The most famous criticism of both Carnap and Ayer is that argued by Wittgenstein and Quine. These philosophers undermined the Carnapian-Ayer conventionalism by arguing that conventionalism leads to a vicious regress as Quine does in his article '<u>Truth by</u> <u>Convention</u><sup>112</sup> ie "...logic is needed for inferring logic from the conventions."<sup>113</sup> As Putnam notes "the exciting thesis that logic is true by convention reduces to the unexciting claim that logic is true by conventions plus logic. No real advance has been made."<sup>114</sup> Now to be fair Quine for his attack on conventionalism does argue that it is still a possiblity. In the same article Quine argues that "it may still be held that... conventions... are observed from the start and that logic and mathematics therby become conventional. It may be held that we can adopt conventions through behavour, without

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> ibid, pp.80-81.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> ibid, p.81.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> H.Putnam, 1985, p.116

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> W.V.Quine 1963, p.343.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> H.Putnam op.cit, p.116.

first announcing them in words; and that we can return and formulate our conventions verbally afterwards, if we choose, when a full language is at our disposal....So concieved the conventions no longer involve us in a vicious regress."<sup>115</sup> Now because of this point, which philosophers overlook in quoting Quine as arguing that conventionalism end in a infinite regress, as Quine goes onto to argue that " But as to the larger thesis that mathematics and logic proceed wholly from linguistic conventions, only further clarification can assure that this asserts anything at all<sup>116</sup>.

Nevertheless Ayer's claim that logical necessity is due to convention does not undercut the idea that logical necessity is still nevertheless psychologically necessary. What it does do is say that logical necessity is not due to the innate nature of our minds, as those philosophers argued in chapter two. This is because once we have been conditioned to accept the conventions and they become established as forms of thinking it then becomes psychologically impossible to think outside the conventions "...for any denial would be self-stultifying."<sup>117</sup> In other words we are conditioned to think in such a way that it becomes psychologically impossible to not believe in logical necessity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> W.V.Quine, op.cit, p.344.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> ibid, p.345.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> A.Ayer op.ct, p.81.

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